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Consider the following scenario:' An individual takes a job and en-
rolls in his employer's employee healthcare benefit plan, which is regu-
lated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act2 (ERISA).
Like many such benefit plan agreements, this plan contains a reim-
bursement provision; the provision requires the employee to reim-
burse the benefit plan for any benefits paid to the employee for an
injury caused by a third party in the event (and to the extent) that the
employee is able to recover from the party at fault.3 While still covered
by the plan, the employee has an accident caused by another party
and suffers extensive injuries. The plan pays for the employee's medi-
cal expenses, but the employee also sues the party at fault. The court
awards a judgment that exceeds the employee's medical expenses.4
The employee, however, refuses to reimburse the plan and spends the
award money otherwise.
t A.B. 2003, Princeton University; J.D. Candidate 2006, The University of Chicago.
I The facts of this hypothetical closely parallel those in Providence Health Plan v
McDowell, 385 F3d 1168 (9th Cir 2004), cert denied, 125 S Ct 1726 (2005) and 125 S Ct 1735
(2005).
2 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 USC § 1001 et seq (2000). An
"'employee benefit plan' or 'plan' means an employee welfare benefit plan or an employee
pension benefit plan or ... both." 29 USC § 1002(3). Welfare benefit plans are those maintained
by an employer to provide for the medical or other current needs of employees and their se-
lected beneficiaries, while pension benefit plans are those maintained to provide retirement
income to employees. 29 USC § 1002(1)-(2). This hypothetical employee's enrollment in the
benefit plan makes him a plan participant, eligible to receive benefits from his employee benefit
plan. 29 USC § 1002(7) (defining "participant"). ERISA defines a plan "beneficiary" as "a per-
son designated by a participant ... who is or may become entitled to a benefit" under the plan.
29 USC § 1002(8). For the purposes of this Comment, however, there is no need to distinguish
between "participants" and "beneficiaries," and therefore both are described by the term "bene-
ficiaries."
3 For an example of such a subrogation provision, see Great-West Life & Annuity Insur-
ance Co v Knudson, 534 US 204,207 (2002) ("[Tlhe Plan shall have 'the right to recover from the
[beneficiary] any payment for benefits' paid by the Plan that the beneficiary is entitled to re-
cover from a third party.").
4 Although in the hypothetical the at-fault third party compensated the beneficiary, Social
Security or any other source of compensation is sufficient for the purpose at hand. What is essen-
tial is that the beneficiary be compensated again by some nonplan entity for the same injury and
expenses the benefit plan originally covered.
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To collect the amount due the plan fiduciary' decides to sue the
employee, but ERISA itself proscribes the available claims. For exam-
ple, the fiduciary may not assert an equity-based restitution claim under
state law because ERISA's civil enforcement provision preempts such a
claim. The fiduciary likewise will be prevented from bringing a breach
of contract claim under ERISA itself because the civil enforcement
provision allows plan fiduciaries to obtain equitable relief only when
enforcing any provision of the plan For the fiduciary, one obvious al-
ternative remains: a legal (as opposed to equitable) breach of contract
claim against the employee based on state law rather than ERISA.
But does ERISA preempt a state law breach of contract claim?'
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's ERISA preemption
and civil remedy jurisprudence and concludes that it allows ERISA
plan fiduciaries to enforce reimbursement provisions in state law
breach of contract suits. Allowing fiduciaries to sue under state law
comports with the Court's reexamination of ERISA preemption in
5 An ERISA fiduciary is any person who exercises discretionary authority or control
respecting the management or administration of a benefit plan, or exercises authority or control
over the disposition of plan assets. 29 USC § 1002(21)(A). ERISA plan fiduciaries are so named
because ERISA requires all assets of employee benefit plans to be held in trust. 29 USC
§ 1103(a). ERISA transposed trust fiduciary law into the regulatory context, requiring all aspects
of plan administration to be governed by the trust fiduciary principles of loyalty and prudence.
29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(A)-(B). ERISA fiduciaries may be, and often are, ERISA employer per-
sonnel, in contrast to traditional trust law's requirement that fiduciaries be disinterested inter-
mediaries. 29 USC § 1108(c)(3) (permitting plan fiduciaries to serve as officers, employees, or
agents of parties in interest in ERISA regulation and litigation).
6 This hypothetical assumes that a court might consider a claim for reimbursement like
the one contemplated here to be equitable. For reason to doubt that such a claim could ade-
quately be formulated, see Knudson, 534 US at 214 (finding that a claim much like the one de-
scribed in this hypothetical sought legal but not equitable restitution).
7 See Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 US 200, 124 S Ct 2488, 2495-96 (2004) (stating that
ERISA can convert a claim pleaded in terms of state law into a federal law claim when ERISA
"wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption"), quoting Benefi-
cial National Bank v Anderson, 539 US 1, 8 (2003); 29 USC § 1132(a) (delineating those entities
authorized to bring a civil action).
8 See 29 USC § 1132(a)(3) (stating that the action may be brought to obtain an injunction
or "other appropriate equitable relief"); Knudson, 534 US at 214, 221 (interpreting "equitable
relief" to exclude actions for reimbursement of an ERISA plan where money or property identi-
fied as belonging to the plaintiff could not clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the
defendant's possession). See also Mertens v Hewitt Associates, 508 US 248, 254 (1993) (stating
that ERISA's "carefully crafted and detailed enforcement scheme provides strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate ex-
pressly") (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that equitable relief could include
that typically available in equity, such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not claims for
compensatory damages. See id at 256.
9 In McDowell, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a state law breach of contract claim was not
preempted because it was merely a claim for reimbursement based upon a third-party settlement
and did not relate to an ERISA plan. 385 F3d at 1172-73 (noting that the plaintiff's claim "does
not fall within ERISA's civil enforcement provision").
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the mid-1990s and would promote a public policy that supports the
purposes underlying ERISA.
Part I traces the legislative history of ERISA and addresses the
purposes of the statute most relevant to this discussion. Part II de-
scribes in greater detail the query posed by the foregoing hypothetical
and follows the two governing lines of jurisprudence from their incep-
tion to the present. Part III argues that ERISA plan fiduciaries ought
to be able to bring state law breach of contract claims for reimburse-
ment against plan beneficiaries.
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF ERISA
A. Pre-ERISA Legislation
Congress first addressed employee benefit plans in 1921 by pro-
viding tax deductions for employers who contributed to employee
pension plans. '° Subsequent legislation further encouraged companies
to establish retirement programs for employees by providing for tax-
exempt trusts and shielding employees from income taxation on con-
tributions made by employers on their behalf."
As Congress expanded the federal role in regulating retirement
and welfare plans, the states enacted their own legislation in an attempt
to increase control over the plans.'2 Congress granted ERISA consid-
erable preemptive power to avoid problems for multistate employers
resulting from differing rules of liability across jurisdictions. Congress
aimed to make the voluntary provision of fringe benefits more attrac-
tive to multistate employers via strong preemption of state regulations;
the resulting uniformity in the legal regime would reduce the adminis-
trative costs to employers of offering employee benefits plans.
1 3
B. Enactment and Purpose
President Ford signed ERISA into law on September 2, 1974.4
Congress intended the Act to guarantee the solvency and integrity of
10 See Revenue Act of 1921 § 219(f), Pub L No 67-98,42 Stat 227, 247 (stating that contri-
butions to qualified plans created by employers "shall not be taxable").
11 See Revenue Act of 1926 § 219(f), Pub L No 69-20, 44 Stat 9, 33-34; Revenue Act of
1928 § 165, Pub L No 70-562,45 Stat 791,839.
12 See Steven J. Sacher, et al, eds, Employee Benefits Law 5 (BNA 1991).
13 See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L Rev 457,465-66 (2003).
14 See Michael G. Kushner and Janet K. Song, eds, ERISA: The Law and The Code v (BNA
2001). The Act was the culmination of efforts begun over a decade earlier when, in 1963, Presi-
dent Kennedy initiated an ambitious study of employee benefit regulation. See Sacher, et al, eds,
Employee Benefits Law at 6 (cited in note 12).
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employer-sponsored private pension plans in order to protect em-
ployees through a uniform federal administrative scheme." In the con-
ference committee responsible for reconciling the Senate and House
versions of the bill, ERISA's scope was expanded to provide for fed-
eral oversight of all employer-sponsored fringe benefit plans, including
medical plans.
16
ERISA is intended to promote the interests of plan beneficiaries
in employee benefit plans by improving the plans' "equitable charac-
ter and soundness."1 Since 1974, Congress has experimented exten-
sively with medical and other employee benefits, but ERISA's struc-
ture and purpose remain unchanged.
ERISA's standards of conduct are meant to be national, allowing
for uniform enforcement and consistent application." Congress's in-
tent to federalize employer sponsored benefits law appears in two
sections of the statute: § 514," which outlines ERISA's preemptive
effect upon state laws; and § 502(a)," the civil enforcement and rem-
edy provision. The preemption provision states that, with a few enu-
merated exceptions not relevant to this Comment, ERISA's regula-
tions "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan., 21 Both "State" and
"State law" are broadly defined for purposes of the preemption provi-
sion.
The civil enforcement and remedy provision details the condi-
tions under which entities and individuals affected by ERISA (includ-
ing states, "participants" in the plans, "beneficiaries," and "fiduciar-
ies") may bring civil suits." The section defines jurisdiction as exclu-
sively federal (with two minor exceptions not relevant to this Com-
ment),24 grants federal jurisdiction regardless of the amount in contro-
versy or the citizenship of the parties, and limits the types of suits
that may be brought.26 Section 502(a)(3) allows plan fiduciaries to ob-
15 See Korobkin, 51 UCLA L Rev at 464-65 (cited in note 13).
16 See id at 465.
17 See 29 USC § 1001(c); Shaw v Delta Air Lines Inc, 463 US 85, 90 (1983) (stating that
ERISA is "designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries").
18 The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans." Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 US 200, 124 S Ct
2488,2495 (2004).
19 29 USC § 1144(a).
20 Id § 1132(a).
21 Id § 1144(a).
22 See id § 1144(c)(1)-(2).
23 Id § 1132(a).
24 Id § 1132(e).
25 Id § 1132(f).
26 Id § 1132(a).
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tain "appropriate equitable relief" to redress certain ERISA viola-
tions and enforce the terms of the benefits plan at issue.27 The interac-
tion between the Supreme Court's expanding interpretation of
ERISA's preemption provision and its narrowing interpretation of
"equitable relief" in the civil enforcement provision frames the ques-
tion that this Comment addresses.
II. THE CURRENT QUANDARY
The following discussion examines two lines of cases: one dealing
with ERISA preemption of state law and the other considering the
meaning of "equitable relief" in the civil remedies provision. Part II.A
reviews the development of ERISA's broad preemption jurisprudence
and offers a synthesis and explanation of the relevant cases. Part II.B
discusses the Supreme Court's treatment of ERISA's civil enforce-
ment provision and the narrowing interpretation of "equitable relief"
in that provision. Part II.C concludes by illustrating how, in the ab-
sence of a state law alternative, these two strands of jurisprudence
converge to leave ERISA fiduciaries without remedy when benefici-
aries party to reimbursement agreements double collect.
A. ERISA Preemption of State Law
Until 1995 the Supreme Court's interpretation of ERISA's pre-
emption provision was consistently both actually and nominally
broad.7 The Court altered its ERISA preemption analysis in 1995 in
an effort to ensure that there was a limit to the scope of ERISA's pre-
emptive force.29 Even so, the Court continues to interpret ERISA's
preemption section broadly, giving the statute far-reaching preemptive
force.3°
27 Id § 1132(a)(3).
28 See Meridith H. Bogart, Note, State Doctrines of Substantial Compliance: A Call for
ERISA Preemption and Uniform Federal Common Law Doctrine, 25 Cardozo L Rev 447,458-59
(2003) ("The Court's initial approach to ERISA preemption during the 1980s and early 1990s
was a broad interpretation of the 'relate to' clause.... [The clause was] literally and strictly inter-
preted.").
29 See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Insurance
Co, 514 US 645, 655 (1995) ("[O]ne might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether [the
preemption provision's] words of limitation ... do much limiting.... [W]e have to recognize that
our prior attempt to construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give us much help drawing the line
here.").
30 See Aetna Health Inc v Davila, 542 US 200,124 S Ct 2488,2495 (2004) ("[Any state-law
cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy
conflicts with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is there-
fore pre-empted."). ERISA's preemption provision itself provides in relevant part: "[Tihe provi-
sions of this subchapter ... shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 USC § 1144(a).
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1. Early ERISA preemption cases: strong presumption of
preemption.
In the early line of ERISA preemption cases, the Supreme Court
adhered to a broad understanding of ERISA preemption, leading al-
most automatically to preemption of the state law at issue. In Shaw v
Delta Air Lines, Inc,3 the first major case to deal with this issue, the
Court articulated a broad standard for ERISA preemption:
The breadth of § 514(a)'s pre-emptive reach is apparent from
that section's language. A law "relates to" an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with
or reference to such a plan.... We must give effect to this plain
language unless there is good reason to believe Congress in-
tended the language to have some more restrictive meaning.32
The Court's reference to Congress's intent is rooted in its approach to
preemption generally.3 The combination of § 514(a)'s broad language
and Congress's intent to federalize employee benefits through ERISA
made the outcome of the "relates to" inquiry in Shaw seem virtually
self-evident to the Court."
Throughout the next decade, the Supreme Court regularly relied
upon the reasoning in Shaw when dealing with ERISA preemption
cases,35 using it to develop at least one lasting concrete rule: ERISA
31 463 US 85 (1983) (holding that ERISA preempted a state human rights law, but that it
did not preempt the disability benefits law at issue).
32 Id at 96-97.
33 See id at 95 ("In deciding whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute, [a court's] task
is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue. Pre-emption ... is com-
pelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 See id at 98 (stating that "Congress used the words 'relate to' in § 514(a) in their broad
sense" and that "given the legislative history [ I § 514(a) [cannot] be interpreted to pre-empt
only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA -reporting, disclosure, fidu-
ciary responsibility, and the like").
35 See, for example, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co v Massachusetts, 471 US 724, 739
(1985) (citing Shaw for the proposition that "[t]he pre-emption provision was intended to dis-
place all state laws that fall within its sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with
ERISA's substantive requirements," because "a state law 'relate[s] to' a benefit plan 'in the nor-
mal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan'). Not all of these
cases, however, resulted in preemption of the state law. In Metropolitan Life Insurance itself, for
example, the statute at issue was saved from ERISA § 514(a) preemption by a special exception
found in § 514(b). See id at 744. In Mackey v Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc, 486 US 825
(1988), the Court invalidated a portion of a statute on the basis of § 514(a) preemption. Id at 830
("The state statute's express reference to ERISA plans suffices to bring it within the federal
law's pre-emptive reach."). The Court let another portion stand, however, on the basis of con-
gressional intent. Id at 840-41. The Court seemed persuaded, at least in part, by the near unified
support of this position by other courts that had considered the question. See id at 832, 840
("This inquiry supports our reading of § 514(a), which is the reading given it by every other court
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preempts any state law which explicitly refers to or is premised upon
the existence of an ERISA-regulated benefit plan. In Ingersoll-Rand
Co v McClendon,3 for example, the Court held that ERISA pre-
empted the common law claim because the claim was "premised on []
the existence of a pension plan."37
2. The modern line of ERISA preemption cases:
1995 to the present.
In 1995 the Court unanimously decided New York State Confer-
ence of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v Travelers Insurance Co,3 al-
tering, at least nominally, its approach to ERISA preemption. In
Travelers, the Court determined that § 514 did not preempt a New
York statute imposing surcharges on hospitals' health maintenance
organizations{° Looking first to the text of § 514(a), the Court noted
that "one might be excused for wondering, at first blush, whether the
words of limitation ('insofar as they.., relate') do much limiting. If
'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeter-
minacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run
its course."" The Court acknowledged that its own "prior attempt to
construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give [ ] much help drawing the
line here," and looked "instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood
would survive." 2 After some discussion of ERISA's purposes and
Congress's intent, the Court concluded that the purpose and effects of
the New York surcharge distinguished it from laws preempted by
ERISA and allowed the surcharge to stand. 3
that has considered the issue in this context (save the Ninth Circuit in a decision that was va-
cated by this Court).").
36 498 US 133 (1990).
37 Id at 140. See also District of Columbia v Greater Washington Board of Trade, 506 US
125, 129-30 (1992) ("Under § 514(a), ERISA pre-empts any state law that refers to or has a
connection with covered benefit plans . . . 'even if the law is not specifically designed to affect
such plans, or the effect is only indirect."'), quoting McClendon, 498 US at 139.
38 514 US 645 (1995).
39 See id at 655.
40 Id at 649 ("We hold that the provisions for surcharges do not 'relate to' employee bene-
fit plans within the meaning of ERISA's pre-emption provision and accordingly suffer no pre-
emption.") (internal citation omitted).
41 Id at 655. This course was hinted at as early as Shaw, but not emphasized until Travelers.
See Shaw, 463 US at 100 n 21, citing with approval American Telephone and Telegraph Co v
Merry, 592 F2d 118, 121 (2d Cir 1979) ("[S]trict, literal construction [ ] would necessarily lead to
the unreasonable conclusion that Congress intended to preempt even those state laws that only
in the most remote and peripheral manner touch upon pension plans.").
42 Travelers, 514 US at 655-56.
43 Id at 658-62.
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Although Travelers represented a shift away from the previous
line of cases and the "infinite connections" understanding of ERISA's
preemption provision that those cases represent, the Court since Trav-
elers has continued to apply § 514(a) broadly. For example, in Egelhoff
v Egelhoff," the Court held that ERISA preempted, to the extent it
applied to ERISA plans, a Washington state statute providing that the
designation of a spouse as an insurance beneficiary is revoked upon
divorce. Though the Court found the law preempted, it admonished
the petitioner for focusing on the broad language in Shaw"6 and reiter-
ated its holding in Travelers that the preemption inquiry should focus
on ERISA's objectives. 4 The Court emphasized that a conclusion re-
garding preemption would depend upon "the nature of the effect of the
state law on ERISA plans." The Washington statute was preempted
because it would affect an ERISA plan's system for processing claims
and paying benefits; because the law affected only Washington state, it
"directly conflict[ed]" with ERISA's purpose of uniformity.
9
The Court's approach to preemption remains especially broad
with regard to ERISA's civil remedy provision. Most recently, in Aetna
Health Inc v Davila,° the Court held that "any state-law cause of ac-
tion that duplicates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil en-
forcement remedy conflicts with the clear congressional intent to
make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted."'" A
state law claim is preempted if it is (1) one for which ERISA provides
a cause of action and (2) one which does not arise independently of
plan terms.2 The Court was particularly concerned with plaintiffs re-
- 532 US 141 (2001).
45 Id at 149-50.
46 Id at 147, citing Shaw, 463 US at 97.
47 Egelhoff, 532 US at 147, quoting Travelers, 514 US at 656.
48 Egelhoff, 532 US at 147, quoting California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v
Dillingham Construction, NA, Inc, 519 US 316,325 (1997).
49 Egelhoff, 532 US at 150. The Court also noted that "[t]he Washington statute also has a
prohibited connection with ERISA plans because it interferes with nationally uniform plan
administration." Id at 148. Compare this holding with the Court's response to an argument that a
preemption ruling would indicate that ERISA preempted "various state statutes providing that a
murdering heir is not entitled to receive property as a result of the killing" because the "'slayer'
statutes could revoke the beneficiary status of someone who murdered a plan participant." Id at
152. Without ruling on the matter, the Court implied that the slayer statutes' "long historical
pedigree predating ERISA" would be a factor in the preemption analysis. Id. Furthermore, the
Court suggested that because nearly every state had such a statute in place, they might not inter-
fere with Congress's intent to create uniformity in employee benefit plan administration and
regulation through ERISA. Id. By implication, more or less uniform contract laws nationwide
should not interfere with ERISA's purpose of uniformity.
50 542 US 200, 124 S Ct 2488 (2004).
51 Idat2495.
52 See id at 2496 ("[I]f an individual, at some point in time, could have brought his claim
under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), and where there is no other independent legal duty that is impli-
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characterizing their state law causes of action in order to avoid
ERISA preemption; the Court explained, "distinguishing between
pre-empted and non-pre-empted claims based on the particular label
affixed to them would elevate form over substance and allow parties
to evade the pre-emptive scope of ERISA simply by relabeling their
[ ] claims." 3
3. ERISA preemption: a unifying theme.
The Supreme Court's approach to ERISA preemption is not en-
capsulated in any of its individual holdings (Davila included) but
must be ascertained by examining the relevant cases to discover a uni-
fying theme. Such an examination reveals that the Court will strike
down as preempted state law causes of action which significantly im-
pact the calculation or administration of benefits under ERISA
plans." For example, in Egelhoff the Court held that ERISA pre-
empted a Washington statute which limited the ability of ERISA plans
to determine who should be deemed a beneficiary. 6 The Court noted
that, "unlike generally applicable laws regulating areas where ERISA
has nothing to say, which we have upheld notwithstanding their inci-
dental effect on ERISA plans, this statute governs the payment of
cated by a defendant's actions, then the individual's cause of action is completely pre-empted by
ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B).").
53 Id at 2498 (internal quotation marks omitted). Note that, in Davila, the Court dealt
specifically with a party attempting to recast a breach of contract claim as an equitable action.
54 In the twenty years since Shaw, the Supreme Court has decided about as many cases
pertaining to ERISA preemption of state laws. In the presence of a clearly articulated guideline
for the lower courts that adequately expressed the Court's intentions, it is unlikely that so many
decisions would have been necessary. See Bogart, Note, 25 Cardozo L Rev at 463-64 (cited in
note 28) (noting that though "[t]he Court moved further away from the liberal 'relate to' test in
its ERISA preemption decisions following Travelers ... subsequent cases did not strictly adhere
to the reasoning in Travelers and provided other reasons for following a restrictive preemption
approach").
55 "Calculation" and "administration" as used here refer to the determination of the ap-
propriate amount of benefits to award to plan beneficiaries and who those beneficiaries will be.
This reduction of the Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence does not account for cases that
do not involve state laws that explicitly mention or are premised upon the existence of ERISA
plans. The laws in such cases are preempted as a matter of course. See text accompanying notes
35-37. See also Mackey, 486 US at 830 (holding that ERISA preempted a state law "which sin-
gle[d] out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment under state garnish-
ment procedures"). In Mackey, the Court admitted that it has "virtually taken it for granted that
state laws which are specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans are pre-empted" by
ERISA. Id at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has indicated a willingness to
continue with this approach even after Travelers. See, for example, DeBuono v NYSA-ILA
Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 US 806, 814-15 (1997) ("This is not a case ... in which
the existence of a [benefit] plan is a critical element of a state-law cause of action, or one in
which the state statute contains provisions that expressly refer to ERISA or ERISA plans.").
56 532 US at 147.
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benefits, a central matter of plan administration. ,7 Similarly, in Alessi
v Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc," the Court again found preemption, not-
ing that the statute in question "relate[d] to pension plans governed
by ERISA because it eliminate[d] one method for calculating pension
benefits- integration- that is permitted by federal law."9
By contrast, in cases in which the Court did not find the state law
in question preempted by ERISA, the Court frequently pointed out
that the law did not interfere with the calculation or administration of
benefits. In DeBuono v NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services
Fund, for example, the Court held that ERISA did not preempt a
state tax in part because the state did not forbid a method of calculat-
ing pension benefits. 61 In the same term Justice Thomas, author of the
Davila opinion, wrote for the majority in California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v Dillingham Construction, NA, Inc,62 holding
that ERISA did not preempt certain state wage laws and apprentice-
ship standards. 6' The Court explained that "[t]he prevailing wage stat-
ute altere[d] the incentives, but [did] not dictate the choices, facing
ERISA plans." And of course, Travelers itself reached its conclusion
that ERISA did not preempt state surcharges assessed against medical
patients in part because the surcharges did not bind plan administra-
tors to any particular choice regarding plan administration, but simply
affected the costs of benefits and the relative costs of competing in-
surance to provide them.6' These cases clearly establish a pattern illus-
trative of the consideration truly decisive to the Court in deciding
whether ERISA preempts a state law cause of action-the impact of
the state law upon the calculation or administration of ERISA plan
benefits.
Davila's holding is consistent with this pattern. Davila involved
two consolidated cases with similar facts. In each case, the plan benefi-
ciary alleged that the ERISA plan insurer did not adequately adminis-
ter the beneficiary's employee benefit plan, denying payment for a
drug in one instance and for a hospital stay in the other.6 The nature
57 Id at 147-48 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
58 451 US 504 (1981).
59 Id at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60 520 US 806 (1997).
61 Id at 814-15 (holding that the statute at issue was one of general applicability that does
not "relate to" benefit plans under the ERISA preemption provision).
62 519 US 316 (1997).
63 Id at 334.
64 Id.
65 See 514 US at 659-60 (explaining that "[a]n indirect economic influence" on the choices
made by insurance buyers, including ERISA plans, "does not bind administrators to any particu-
lar choice" and so does not "function as a regulation of an ERISA plan").
66 See Davila, 124 S Ct at 2496-97.
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of the two complaints led the Court to determine that the beneficiar-
ies "complain only about denials of coverage promised under the
terms of ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans."6
Ostensibly operating under the Davila framework, the Ninth Cir-
cuit recently determined that an ERISA fiduciary's state law breach
of contract action against a double-collecting beneficiary was not pre-
empted by ERISA. In Providence Health Plan v McDowell,"6 the court
held that the breach of contract action was not preempted because it
did not have an appropriate "connection with" an employee benefit
plan, and did not fall within the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement
provision.6 The court described the factors influencing its holding:
[The ERISA plan insurer] is simply attempting, through contract
law, to enforce the reimbursement provision. Adjudication of its
claim does not require interpreting the plan or dictate any sort of
distribution of benefits. [The ERISA plan insurer] has already
paid ERISA benefits on behalf of the [beneficiaries], and they
are not disputing the correctness of the benefits paid.... Because
this is merely a claim for reimbursement based upon the third-
party settlement, it does not "relate to" the plan.
This rationale is consistent with the unifying theme of the Supreme
Court's ERISA preemption cases as articulated in the preceding para-
graph: ERISA will only preempt state laws and causes of action that
substantially affect the determination and administration of benefits.
B. "Equitable Relief": ERISA's Civil Enforcement Remedy
Provision
The Supreme Court made clear in 2002's Great-West Life & An-
nuity Insurance Co v Knudson' that its interpretation of "equitable
relief' under § 502(a)(3) is quite narrow, limiting the remedies avail-
67 Id at 2497.
68 385 F3d 1168 (9th Cir 2004), cert denied, 125 S Ct 1726 (2005) and 125 S Ct 1735 (2005).
69 385 F3d at 1172.
70 Id, citing Blue Cross of California v Anesthesia Care Associates Medical Group, Inc, 187
F3d 1045,1053-54 (9th Cir 1999). Note that the majority opinion does not cite Davila at all, and
the dissent does so in only the most cursory fashion. See McDowell, 385 F3d at 1176 (Thomas
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) ("[The majority's holding] cannot be reconciled
with our precedent, nor with the Supreme Court's ERISA decisions. Indeed, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila further bolsters the opposite conclusion.")
(internal citation omitted). This treatment indicates that the Ninth Circuit views Davila as
merely supplementing rather than replacing earlier Supreme Court ERISA preemption juris-
prudence.
71 534 US 204 (2002).
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able to only those typically available at equity.72 ERISA § 502(a)(3)
allows a civil action to be brought
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provi-
sions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.3
The following discussion highlights the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of § 502(a)(3), beginning with the decision of Massachusetts Mu-
tual Life Insurance Co v Russell" in 1985.
The Court's current interpretation of ERISA's civil remedy pro-
vision reflects the tack chosen in Russell." In Russell, the Supreme
Court held that the only remedies available for violation of ERISA
are those that the statute itself authorizes."6 Russell involved an
ERISA plan beneficiary who was paid all the benefits to which she
was contractually entitled. The beneficiary nevertheless sued her plan
fiduciary, pleading various state law and ERISA-based causes of ac-
tion involving the plan administrators' alleged delay in processing her
disputed claim." The plaintiff argued that ERISA contained an im-
plied right of action for "extracontractual" damages. After examining
the statute's legislative history, the Court concluded that "Congress
did not intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to in-
corporate expressly."' 9
Eight years after Russell, the Court decided Mertens v Hewitt As-
sociates," in which the petitioners sought money damages under
72 Id at 214-15 (holding that § 502(a)(3) tracks "fine distinction[s]" between at-law and
equitable relief when such distinctions are relevant). See also Roger M. Baron, Public Policy
Considerations Warranting Denial of Reimbursement to ERISA Plans: It's Time to Recognize the
Elephant in the Courtroom, 55 Mercer L Rev 595, 598 (2004) (noting that the Knudson majority
construed § 502(a)(3) narrowly in light of the statutory language).
73 29 USC § 1132(a)(3).
74 473 US 134 (1985).
75 See John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by Equitable: The Supreme Court's Trial of
Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 Colum L Rev 1317, 1338 (2003) ("The Supreme
Court's engagement with ERISA remedy law got off to a bad start in 1985 on account of unwise
dicta in [Russell].").
76 See Russell, 473 US at 146. See also Langbein, 103 Colum L Rev at 1342-43 (cited in
note 75) (discussing dicta in Russell expressing "concern to avoid implying a cause of action ...
that Congress may have deliberately omitted").
77 Russell, 473 US at 136-37.
78 Id at 145 (reporting that the respondent argued that an implied right should be found
under the test of Cort v Ash), citing Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 78 (1975) (listing several factors for
determining an implicit right in a statute).
79 Russell, 473 US at 146.
80 508 US 248 (1993).
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§ 502(a)(3).8' Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stressed that
"[m]oney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief" and
found that the petitioners sought compensatory damages rather than the
equitable relief afforded by § 502(a)(3)." Remedies under § 502(a)(3)
were and are limited to those typically available at equity.u In a last-
ditch effort to salvage the case, the petitioner contended that the
Court's interpretation would leave beneficiaries less protected than
before ERISA's enactment: state law causes of action formerly avail-
able to them would now be preempted, contradicting ERISA's basic
goal of protecting employees and their dependents.w The Court re-
jected the argument, holding that the text was dispositive.8
5
In Knudson the Court reiterated that "equitable relief" in ERISA
§ 502(a)(3) referred only to those remedies "typically available at eq-
uity." The case involved a reimbursement provision requiring plan
beneficiaries to give to the plan fiduciary any sum recovered from a
third party for the beneficiary's injuries, up to the amount paid to the
beneficiary by the fiduciary.8 The respondent, Knudson, was rendered
quadriplegic by a car accident, and the petitioner, Great-West, an
ERISA fiduciary, paid her benefits." Knudson forced a settlement
81 Id at 251 ("Petitioners sought certiorari only on the question whether ERISA authorizes
suits for money damages against nonfiduciaries who knowingly participate in a fiduciary's breach
of fiduciary duty.").
82 Id at 255. The Court acknowledged, however, that monetary relief was sometimes
granted in equity courts, which at common law had the power to establish purely legal rights and
grant legal remedies. See id at 256. Therefore, the Court reasoned, "equitable relief' could mean
"whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particular case at issue"
(which, as ERISA creates trust relations, would include equitable and legal remedies in ERISA
cases), or simply "those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunc-
tion, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages)." Id. The Court concluded that
as equity courts could grant "all relief available" in trust cases, the former reading would make
the modifier "equitable" superfluous and thus the Court chose the latter. Id at 257-58. This in-
terpretation definitively prevents ERISA plan fiduciaries from bringing at-law reimbursement
claims such as breach of contract or restitution under ERISA itself, since those claims would not
yield the types of remedies "typically" available at equity.
83 Idat256.
84 Idat261.
85 Id ("[V]ague notions of a statute's 'basic purpose' are [] inadequate to overcome the
words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration."). Though in Mertens the Court
had no problems leaving the beneficiary without remedy, it did so in the face of text it considered
clear. By contrast, the "relates to" language in ERISA's preemption provision is, by the Court's
own concession, in need of interpretation. See Travelers, 514 US at 658 (using ERISA's purpose
as a guide to determine preemption in the face of indeterminate text).
86 Knudson, 534 US at 211.
87 Id at 207 ("Specifically, the Plan has 'a first lien upon any recovery ... ' that the benefici-
ary receives from the third party."). The plan's terms of agreement provided for personal liability
in the event the beneficiary recovered from a third party and failed to reimburse the fiduciary.
See id.
88 Id.
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with a third party exceeding the benefits paid, and Great-West subse-
quently sued in federal court under ERISA § 502(a)(3) to collect an
amount equal to the benefits.8 9
Great-West made two principal arguments. First, Great-West ar-
gued that it sought only an injunction to compel the payment of the
money owed.6 The Court relied on Mertens to conclude that Great-
West could not advance this theory under § 502(a)(3)(A) or (B) be-
cause the remedies sought (an injunction to compel the payment of
money contractually owed and specific performance of a contract to
pay money) were not typically available at equity.9'
Second, Great-West argued that its suit delineated an equitable
claim for restitution and was therefore authorized by § 502(a)(3)(B).'
This approach, the Court said, was only nominally consistent with
Mertens. Restitution claims can be legal as well as equitable; the na-
ture of a given claim depends on the claim's basis and the nature of
the remedies sought. Ultimately the Court in Knudson determined
that Great-West did not seek equitable restitution. 3 Equitable restitu-
tion would return particular funds or property in Knudson's posses-
sion to Great-West. Legal restitution would not seek particular funds
or property but would allow any funds available to satisfy a debt for
which Knudson was personally liable. Because Great-West did not
seek the return of particular funds but merely the payment of "some"
funds to which it was entitled for benefits conferred, Great-West
sought a legal remedy.9" Section 502(a)(3) allows only for equitable
relief and therefore did not authorize Great-West's action.9
6
C. The Intersection of ERISA Preemption and Civil Remedies:
A "Regulatory Vacuum"?
Considered individually, the above developments in ERISA's
preemption and civil remedies jurisprudence may not seem worri-
89 Idat208.
90 Id at 210 (reporting that Great-West claimed to "seek 'to enjoin an act or practice'-
respondent's failure to reimburse the plan").
91 See id at 211. In a footnote the Court stated that the injunction referred to in
§ 502(a)(3)(A) must be equitable in nature because § 502(a)(3)(B) refers to "other" equitable
relief. Knudson, 534 US at 211 n 1. Further, the Court held that injunctions are inherently equi-
table; without such a limitation on the scope of injunctive relief, the limitation of remedy to
injunction would be meaningless, "since any claim for legal relief can, with lawyerly inventive-
ness, be phrased in terms of an injunction." Id.
92 Idat212.
93 See id at 214 (concluding that Great-West did not seek a constructive trust or equitable
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some, or even remarkable. Operating in conjunction, however, they
may foreclose the possibility of relief for ERISA fiduciaries injured by
double-collecting beneficiaries who refuse to reimburse per their con-
tractual obligations.97 In her concurrence in Davila, Justice Ginsburg
expressed concern that the Court's ERISA preemption and civil
remedies jurisprudence together create a "regulatory vacuum" in
which "[v]irtually all state law remedies are preempted but very few
federal substitutes are provided."' Justice Ginsburg's concern seems
particularly well founded in light of the difficulty of properly con-
structing a claim for equitable relief under Knudson.
Several courts of appeals have considered which types of reim-
bursement remedies constitute "equitable relief" under the Knudson
standard." These cases have followed Knudson's approach, severely
limiting the types of remedies available to fiduciaries in reimburse-
ment actions against double-collecting beneficiaries. Three approaches
exist: treating all reimbursement claims as legal; treating recovery as
equitable only when a fiduciary can identify the particular funds paid
by the fiduciary to the beneficiary in compensation for a given injury;
and treating recovery as equitable whenever a fiduciary can identify
funds paid to the beneficiary by either the fiduciary itself or some
third party in compensation for the same injury. All three approaches
make recovery by fiduciaries under ERISA quite difficult.
The Ninth Circuit has taken the first approach, denying recovery
in federal court to all fiduciaries seeking reimbursement. In Westaff
(USA) Inc v Arce,"' the court focused on language in Mertens and
Knudson instructing courts to "look[] past the parties' chosen labels to
the substance of the relief sought," which in that case, the court de-
termined, was compensation for a breach of contract."' The court ex-
97 See Davila, 124 S Ct at 2503 (Ginsburg concurring).
98 Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 See, for example, Qualchoice, Inc v Rowland, 367 F3d 638, 643-49 (6th Cir 2004) (de-
scribing Knudson and numerous cases applying it, before concluding that an action to force
performance of a contract to pay money does not seek equitable relief), cert denied, 125 S Ct
1639 (2005); Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v Ferrer, Poirot and Wans-
brough, 354 F3d 348, 355-57 (5th Cir 2003) (distinguishing Knudson on the facts where the de-
fendant had "ultimate control over, and thus constructive possession of, the disputed funds"), cert
denied, 124 S Ct 2412 (2004); Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc Associates'
Health and Welfare Plan v Varco, 338 F3d 680, 686-88 (7th Cir 2003) (distinguishing Knudson
where the funds were "held in [the defendant's] reserve bank account"), cert denied, 124 S Ct
2904 (2004); Westaff (USA) Inc v Arce, 298 F3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir 2002) (describing
Knudson and concluding that plaintiffs sought legal "money damages" where the money sought
was specifically identifiable and held in an escrow account), cert denied, 537 US 1111 (2003).
100 298 F3d 1164 (9th Cir 2002).
101 Id at 1166 ("Westaff is seeking to enforce a contractual obligation for the payment of
money, a classic action at law and not an equitable claim.").
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plicitly denied that this determination turned on whether particular
funds could be identified.)
The paradigm case for the opposite approach is Bombardier
Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v Ferrer, Poirot and Wans-
brough.'3 The Fifth Circuit outlined a three-prong test for determining
whether a fiduciary seeks equitable relief, holding that a reimburse-
ment action is equitable if it seeks to recover funds that (1) are spe-
cifically identifiable, (2) belong in good conscience to the benefit plan,
and (3) are within the possession and control of the beneficiary."'
No court of appeals has yet adopted the intermediate approach,'O,
but the Sixth Circuit has left the possibility open. In Qualchoice, Inc v
Rowland, °" the court held that a fiduciary's reimbursement action is
legal when the ERISA beneficiary recovers from a third party and
possesses that recovery in an identifiable fund.ln The case, however,
does not determine whether the action would be legal if the benefici-
ary maintained an identifiable fund containing money paid to the
beneficiary by the fiduciary. In Community Health Plan of Ohio v
Mosser1 8 (relied upon by the court in Rowland), however, the court
suggests in dicta that in order to recover the plaintiff must be able to
identify money that it has given to the defendant and wants retumed."9
102 See id at 1167 ("This case differs from our prior cases [denying at-law remedies under
ERISA] only in that the money at issue, a legitimate personal injury settlement to which the
beneficiary is entitled, has been placed in an escrow account and remains specifically identifiable.
The action remains one for money damages.").
103 354 F3d 348 (5th Cir 2003).
104 See id at 356. For support, the court cited the Seventh Circuit's decision in Varco, which
pursued a nearly identical analytic path. Id at 357 & n 40, citing Varco, 338 F3d at 687-88. Varco
holds that "the reimbursement action ... in this unique case is equitable because the funds the
[fiduciary] seeks to recover are identifiable, are in the control of [the beneficiary], and the [fidu-
ciary] is right-fully entitled to the monies under the terms of the Plan." 338 F3d at 688.
105 The Third and Fourth Circuits have each considered the reimbursement issue generally,
"but have done so only in unpublished opinions involving obscure factual scenarios." See Row-
land, 367 F3d at 647, citing Sackman v Teaneck Nursing Center, 2003 US App LEXIS 26668, *5-7
(3d Cir) (relying upon Knudson to deny reimbursement because the ERISA fiduciary sought to
impose a form of personal liability upon the beneficiary); Local 109 Retirement Fund v First
Union National Bank, 2003 US App LEXIS 1066, *5 (4th Cir) (holding that a bank's "agreement
in a certificate of deposit or other instrument to repay a specified amount of money (plus inter-
est) is quintessentially a legal agreement" and finding no equitable claim).
106 367 F3d 638 (6th Cir 2004).
107 Id at 650. The court in Rowland had a secondary justification for its decision: in previous
cases the Sixth Circuit decided that subrogation is not available when a beneficiary has already
recovered from the third party, but rather is only available in cases in which the fiduciary steps
into the shoes of the beneficiary to assert the beneficiary's rights against another. Id at 649-50.
Subrogation, therefore, cannot be used to impose personal liability upon the beneficiary. Id.
108 347 F3d 619 (6th Cir 2003).
109 Id at 624 (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff "did not ...
allege that it had given certain funds to [the defendant], trace those funds to the settlement funds
... and seek the return of the settlement funds").
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Given the interpretation of Knudson by lower courts and
ERISA's broad preemptive power, an ERISA fiduciary's options for
reimbursement from a double-collecting beneficiary are limited at
best."0 After Davila one might assume that ERISA would preempt a
state law breach of contract claim for reimbursement, leaving the fi-
duciary without any remedy at all. The next Part argues that the
Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence allows such a cause of ac-
tion to survive.
III. ERISA PLAN FIDUCIARIES SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO BRING
STATE LAW BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS FOR REIMBURSEMENT
The Supreme Court's preemption jurisprudence can be inter-
preted to permit ERISA fiduciaries to bring state law breach of con-
tract claims for reimbursement against double-collecting ERISA
beneficiaries. In Knudson the Supreme Court clearly ruled out the
possibility of future reimbursement actions by plan fiduciaries against
beneficiaries under ERISA (by any means other than a constructive
trust or equitable lien),"' but it intentionally expressed no opinion as
to whether ERISA would preempt an action by a plan fiduciary as-
serting state law claims, such as breach of contract, against a plan
beneficiary."2 The following discussion considers the question in light
of the Court's overall ERISA preemption jurisprudence and con-
cludes that a state law breach of contract claim could and should es-
cape ERISA preemption.
Part III.A demonstrates that ERISA provides no cause of action
for fiduciaries seeking reimbursement under a breach of contract the-
ory. Part III.B argues that the preemption question should be consid-
ered in light of the entirety of the Supreme Court's ERISA preemp-
110 Even under the most liberal interpretation of Knudson (something akin to the Fifth
Circuit's approach in Bombardier), a beneficiary who double recovers could effectively shield
funds from fiduciaries seeking reimbursement under ERISA simply by making the funds "uni-
dentifiable." Among the courts that have denied recovery in the reimbursement actions thus far
discussed, Knudson among them, all have held that the basis for the ERISA fiduciary's reim-
bursement claim was a legal claim for which ERISA provides no relief. See, for example,
Knudson, 534 US at 214 (holding that plaintiffs sought "not equitable .. but legal" restitution);
Westaff, 298 F3d at 1167 (referring to Knudson's finding of legal restitution and stating that
"[tihe action [at issue] remains one for money damages").
111 Because the Court construes both "equitable lien" and "constructive trust" so narrowly
in Knudson, it is unlikely that either will be a viable option for plan fiduciaries seeking reim-
bursement for benefits paid. See Knudson, 534 US at 213-14 (allowing these theories only
"where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could
clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's possession").
112 See id at 220 ("We express no opinion as to ... whether a direct action by petitioners
against respondents asserting state-law claims such as breach of contract would have been pre-
empted by ERISA.").
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tion jurisprudence and not merely in light of the most recent case,
Davila. Part III.C analyzes the state law reimbursement claims in light
of the overall ERISA preemption jurisprudence, noting an impasse on
the question of whether reimbursement agreements significantly af-
fect the calculation of ERISA benefits. Part III.D looks to the effects of
denying a remedy to ERISA fiduciaries in order to break the deadlock,
concluding that those effects favor allowing fiduciaries to bring state
law breach of contract claims against double-collecting beneficiaries.
A. ERISA Provides No Cause of Action for Plan Fiduciaries
Seeking Reimbursement Under a Breach of Contract Theory
An ERISA fiduciary's breach of contract claim for reimburse-
ment is one for which ERISA provides no cause of action, meeting
one of the statute's criteria for nonpreemption. The Supreme Court
explicitly stated that a person's cause of action is completely pre-
empted if, at some point in time, that person could have brought his
claim under ERISA.113 In other words, for a claim to survive preemp-
tion by ERISA, it is necessary but not sufficient that ERISA provide
no cause of action for the claim. Because ERISA affords equitable
relief in § 502(a)(3), an ERISA fiduciary could not bring an equity-
based claim for reimbursement under state law.' To escape preemp-
tion, then, any state law claim must be at-law."' A fiduciary could not
bring a state law breach of contract claim under ERISA because
ERISA provides no cause of action for claims seeking legal remedies.
ERISA might provide a cause of action for (and therefore pre-
empt) state law breach of contract actions which can be characterized
as claims for equitable relief, but such cases do not alter ERISA's pre-
emptive effect upon true legal claims. Because ERISA's civil enforce-
ment provision contemplates equitable relief, a state at-law cause of
action will not escape preemption if it can accurately be characterized
as a claim for equitable relief. Mertens and Knudson involved causes of
action characterized by the parties as equity-based claims but deter-
113 Davila, 124 S Ct at 2496.
114 See id ("Thus, the ERISA civil enforcement mechanism is one of those provisions with
such extraordinary pre-emptive power that it converts an ordinary state common law complaint
into one stating a federal claim.") (internal citation and quotations omitted). This conclusion is
consistent with ERISA's purpose of providing a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit
plans and its reason for including such admittedly expansive preemption provisions See id at 2495.
115 Any possibility of bringing "disguised" at-law claims under ERISA is, of course, fore-
closed by Mertens and Knudson-the narrow construction of "equitable relief' in those cases
excludes the possibility of reimbursement under ERISA. See Mertens, 508 US at 256 (reading
"equitable relief" in § 502(a)(3) to mean only relief "typically available in equity"); Knudson, 534
US at 221 (citing Mertens and stressing deference to Congress).
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mined by the Court to be at-law."6 The Court could consider a cause of
action brought in state court to be an at-law claim to be an equity-
based claim if it is possible to form a constructive trust or equitable lien
theory of recovery for that claim. If a court or plan beneficiary suc-
cessfully construed a fiduciary's breach of contract or restitution claim
as an equitable claim (one seeking "not to impose personal liability on
the [beneficiary], but to restore to the [fiduciary] particular funds or
property in the [beneficiary's] possession""'), the cause of action is
one that could have been brought under ERISA § 502(a)(3). Such a
claim would be preempted under Davila because it "falls within the
scope of ERISA" and must be brought under ERISA or not at all.""
Even if some state at-law claims can be recharacterized as equi-
table claims that must be brought under ERISA, this is not possible
for every state action. Unless permitted to bring state law breach of
contract claims, at least some, if not many, ERISA plan fiduciaries will
be left with claims that would ordinarily be cognizable breach of con-
tract claims and no venue in which to bring them. Though the Su-
preme Court's ERISA preemption and "equitable relief' jurispru-
dence could be interpreted so as to leave those fiduciaries without
judicial recourse, that would be a policy decision by no means com-
pelled by the case law and an ill-advised interpretation of the relevant
statutes. The above discussion demonstrates that ERISA provides no
cause of action for state law breach of contract claims, which therefore
survive at least one level of preemption analysis. "9
B. ERISA's Entire Preemption Jurisprudence-Not Just Davila-
Must Be Considered
The question of preemption of state law breach of contract claims
for reimbursement should be considered in light of the entirety of the
116 See Mertens, 508 US at 255 ("Petitioners maintain that the object of their suit is appro-
priate equitable relief .... They do not, however, seek a remedy traditionally viewed as equita-
ble.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Knudson, 534 US at 210-11 ("[P]etitioners argue that
they are entitled to relief under § 502(a)(3) .... But an injunction to compel the payment of
money past due under a contract, or specific performance of a past due monetary obligation, was
not typically available in equity.").
117 Knudson, 534 US at 214.
118 See Davila, 124 S Ct at 2496. This conclusion is consistent with the Court's holding in
Davila that "distinguishing between pre-empted and non-pre-empted claims based on the par-
ticular label affixed to them would elevate form over substance and allow parties to evade the
pre-emptive scope of ERISA simply by relabeling their ... claims." Id at 2498 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Indeed, the Court has on at least one occasion ruled that a state cause of action
"was pre-empted because it attempted to convert an equitable remedy into a legal remedy." Id at
2499, citing McClendon, 498 US 133.
119 See Davila, 124 S Ct at 2496 (requiring preemption when a plaintiff could have brought
a claim under ERISA and "there is no independent legal duty that is implicated").
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Supreme Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence and not merely in
light of the most recent case, Davila. In Travelers, the Court professed
to retreat from its stance supporting expansive ERISA preemption
powers. Its justification for this shift was that its previous approach
seemed limitless: "If 'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest
stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-
emption would never run its course, for really, universally, relations
stop nowhere."'2 Extraordinarily literal interpretation of the Court's
language in Davila might create the same concern: the range of state
law causes of action that may "duplicate, supplement, or supplant the
ERISA civil enforcement remedy" is itself nearly limitless given a
sufficiently literal interpretation of "duplicate, supplement, or sup-
plant.''. ERISA's preemption provision states that ERISA shall su-
persede "any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.'.' An overly literal interpretation
of the preemption provision should be avoided as it would have pro-
found consequences and represent a substantial step back toward the
jurisprudence Travelers rejected.
Proper interpretation of the Court's precedent disposes of a for-
malistic objection to this conclusion. The formalistic argument pro-
ceeds this way: because the state law reimbursement claim depends
upon the existence of an ERISA-regulated contractual agreement, it
"relates to" ERISA sufficiently to justify preemption, even though
judicial resolution of the complaint does not directly affect the dispo-
sition of benefits. This argument seems supported by occasional refer-
ence in Supreme Court case law to causes of action preempted be-
cause they depend upon the existence of an ERISA benefit plan.'1 The
cases alluded to, however, preempt causes of action that are premised
entirely upon (and could not exist without) ERISA benefit plans in
particular, not causes of action arising from regulated relationships
that simply happen to include ERISA benefit plans."4 In other words,
120 Travelers, 514 US at 655 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 See Davila, 542 US at --, 124 S Ct at 2495 ("[Alny state-law cause of action that dupli-
cates, supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear
congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore pre-empted."). Note
that Justice Souter, the author of the unanimous opinion in Travelers, joined in the majority
opinion in Davila.
122 29 USC § 1144(a).
123 See, for example, DeBuono, 520 US at 814-15 (stating that ERISA would preempt a
state law cause of action when "the existence of a [benefit] plan is a critical element of a state-
law cause of action").
124 See, for example, McClendon, 498 US at 139-40 ("We are not dealing here with a gener-
ally applicable statute that makes no reference to, or indeed functions irrespective of, the exis-
tence of an ERISA plan.... Here, the existence of a pension plan is a critical factor in establish-
ing liability under the State's wrongful discharge law.").
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the Supreme Court has held preempted state laws that regulate only
(or, arguably, primarily) ERISA benefit plans such that causes of ac-
tion arising under those laws are dependent upon the plans' existence.
Though the Court has never said as much explicitly, this hard and fast
rule likely grew out of a strong presumption that any law expressly
referring to ERISA would substantially affect the calculation or ad-
ministration of benefits.'6 To the extent that state contract laws make
no explicit mention of ERISA plans and do not rely upon their exis-
tence to create causes of action, regulation of the reimbursement
agreements at issue here will not be preempted by this line of cases.
'2
C. Contractual Reimbursement Agreements in Light of ERISA's
Entire Preemption Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court will strike down as preempted an ERISA fi-
duciary's state law breach of contract claim for reimbursement if the
reimbursement provision at issue significantly affects the calculation
or administration of ERISA benefits.'27 Under one view, a claim for
reimbursement does not affect benefit calculation or administration in
the slightest. Under this approach, the benefits are calculated and dis-
tributed to the plan beneficiary before the beneficiary collects from
the third party. Once those benefits have been received by the benefi-
ciary, all calculation and administration of benefits is complete. Any
subsequent dispute over reimbursement under the agreement be-
tween the beneficiary and the fiduciary is unrelated to benefit calcula-
tion or administration; therefore a dispute over reimbursement under
state law would not be preempted. Under the opposite view, determin-
ing what amount of benefits previously paid to the beneficiary must
125 See, for example, Mackey v Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc, 486 US 825, 829
(1988) (holding that ERISA preempted a state law "which single[d] out ERISA employee wel-
fare benefit plans for different treatment under state garnishment procedures").
126 In the only Supreme Court case to directly confront the question of whether reim-
bursement "relates to" an ERISA plan, the Supreme Court based its conclusion upon an explicit
mention of ERISA-regulated plans in the antisubrogation statute at issue. See FMC Corp v
Holliday, 498 US 52, 59 (1990) (holding that "Pennsylvania's antisubrogation law 'relates to' an
employee benefit plan" because it "has a 'reference' to benefit plans governed by ERISA"). The
Court also relied heavily on the broad language in Shaw that Travelers rejected. See id at 58-59.
Even if the Court were to sustain this part of Holliday's holding today, the holding's applicability
would be limited to laws explicitly mentioning ERISA regulated plans. Note also that Holliday's
holding with regard to the "relates to" analysis ultimately allowed the fiduciary to bring its reim-
bursement claim by preempting the antisubrogation law. See id at 65. Compare Holliday with the
law at issue in Singh v Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc, 335 F3d 278, 284 (4th Cir 2003) (citing
Holliday for the proposition that state antisubrogation laws "relate to" employee benefit plans),
in which both parties conceded that the antisubrogation law at issue "related to" an ERISA
regulated benefit plan.
127 See Part II.A.3.
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be reimbursed is a part of the ERISA benefit calculation. A dispute
over reimbursement, then, substantially affects the calculation or ad-
ministration of benefits and is preempted by ERISA.
The courts of appeals to consider this question have opted for the
latter approach, but supply no reason as to why this approach is man-
dated or preferred.'9 The Fifth Circuit's consideration of this question
in Arana v Ochsner Health Plan12 is illustrative. Plaintiff Arana sought
a judgment declaring that Ochsner was not entitled to reimbursement
of any portion of the benefits Ochsner paid Arana prior to Arana's
collection from a third party, despite the existence of a reimbursement
provision." The panel noted that Arana had been paid all benefits due
to him... and cited Knudson as support for denying Arana's claim for
ERISA protection on the ground that the claim was merely "akin" to
132
a suit to enforce the terms of the ERISA plan.
Upon rehearing en banc, the court ruled that Arana's claim could
fairly be characterized as a claim to recover benefits due under the
ERISA plan.'33 In support of this conclusion, the court offered the fol-
lowing statement: "It could be said, then, that although the benefits
have already been paid, Arana has not fully 'recovered' them because
he has not obtained the benefits free and clear of [Ochsner's]
claims."' 4 No further analysis was offered as to why this conclusion is
128 See, for example, Arana v Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F3d 433, 438 (5th Cir 2003) (en
banc) (holding that a beneficiary's claim to recover benefits reimbursed to the ERISA fiduciary
could "fairly be characterized as [ I a claim to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan") (internal quotation marks omitted); Lyons v Philip Morris, Inc, 225 F3d 909 (8th Cir 2000)
(holding that reimbursement claims by ERISA fiduciaries against tobacco companies were
preempted to the extent that the claims were premised upon the recovery of health benefits paid
by ERISA plans).
129 302 F3d 462 (5th Cir 2002), revd, 338 F3d 433.
130 Arana, 302 F3d at 466. Note that the court was somewhat reluctant to consider the reim-
bursement provision part of the ERISA plan at issue. See id at 471-72. It is tempting to argue
that reimbursement provisions are not part of ERISA plans at all (which would mean that adju-
dication of the provisions would not be preempted by ERISA). Under this view "the plan" is
simply that portion of the relevant documents which describes the calculation and administration of
benefits, while the reimbursement provision is an independent obligation-a function of plan
funding. Indeed, at least one Supreme Court opinion arguably lends support to this view. See
Pegram v Herdrich, 530 US 211,223 (2000) ("Rules governing collection of premiums, definition
of benefits, submission of claims, and resolution of disagreements over entitlement to services
are the sorts of provisions that constitute [an ERISA] plan."). It is practically impossible that the
Supreme Court would hold that the reimbursement provisions are not actually part of the bene-
fit plans, however, because such an interpretation would foreclose the possibility of equitable
recovery for breach of a reimbursement agreement under ERISA, which is unquestionably
approved of in Knudson. See 534 US at 213 ("[A] plaintiff could seek restitution in equity.").
131 See Arana, 302 F3d at 472 n 10.
132 Id at 472.
133 See Arana, 338 F3d at 438.
134 Id.
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mandated or preferred over the panel's decision (though some Fifth
Circuit precedent yielding similar conclusions was cited)."
Neither unassisted logic nor ERISA itself requires a court to fa-
vor one approach to this problem over another, yet it is essential to
the ERISA preemption analysis that an approach be chosen. If a claim
for reimbursement is considered a claim for benefits, the reimburse-
ment claim substantially affects the calculation and administration of
ERISA benefits and is preempted. The following Part argues that a
claim for reimbursement should not be considered a claim for benefits
and, consequently, that the reimbursement claim is not preempted.
D. The Negative Effects of Preempting Breach of Contract Claims
Suggest That the Claims Should Be Permitted
To escape the logical deadlock noted above, it is permissible to
consider the effects of preemption of the claim at issue (and other
claims like it). In Travelers and other cases, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly considered the effects of its decision in its preemption calcu-
lus."' The weight of those effects is not made explicit, but the case law
suggests that the more serious and widespread the effects of preemp-
tion, the less likely the Court will find a state law preempted.'37 The
negative effects of preempting state law reimbursement actions by
fiduciaries argue against interpreting reimbursement provisions to
significantly affect the calculation or administration of ERISA benefits.
Reimbursement provisions exist to control the cost of providing
insurance." Not allowing fiduciaries to enforce them will result in ei-
ther (1) a general increase in rates in order to recoup losses to double-
collecting beneficiaries who refuse to reimburse the plan as per their
contractual obligations or (2) a delay in the initial payment of benefits
to accident victims as insurers "wait and see" if the beneficiary will
135 See id at 438 n 8.
136 See Travelers, 514 US at 664-65 (considering the effects of preempting a state law upon
the state's ability to regulate hospital costs). See also Massachusetts v Morash, 490 US 107, 118-
19 (1989) (considering the "profound consequences" of treating routine vacation pay policies as
a part of ERISA-regulated benefit plans, including the displacement effects on state laws cur-
rently regulating those pay policies).
137 See Travelers, 514 US at 661:
The bigger the package of regulation with indirect effects that would fall on the [beneficiar-
ies'] reading of § 514, the less likely it is that [it is correct] .... [T]o read the pre-emption
provision as displacing all state laws affecting costs and charges on the theory that they in-
directly relate to ERISA plans ... would effectively read the limiting language in § 514(a)
out of the statute.
138 See In re Paris, 2000 US App LEXIS 6883, *8-9 (4th Cir) ("Subrogation is an extremely
important tool for maintaining the financial viability of [self-funded ERISA] plans.").
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collect from a third party before committing funds.'39 These changes
are adverse to the interests of plan beneficiaries, the parties whom
ERISA is primarily intended to protect.' The negative effects of pro-
hibiting the state law claims of ERISA fiduciaries suggest that the
preferable interpretation of the reimbursement provisions should not
consider them to substantially affect the calculation or administration
of ERISA benefits.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court could formalistically interpret its most recent
precedent to forbid state law reimbursement claims by ERISA fiduci-
aries against double-collecting beneficiaries, but it ought not do so.
Confronted with precedent that does not compel either conclusion,
the Court ought to consider the at-law reimbursement claims in light
of ERISA's purpose of protecting plan beneficiaries and the Court's
own move away from excessively literal interpretation of ERISA's
preemption provision. So doing will eliminate the possibility of the
"regulatory vacuum" that Justice Ginsburg fears and establish an ad-
ministrable, predictable system.
139 See Lisa N. Bleed, Comment, Enforcing Subrogation Provisions as "Appropriate Equita-
ble Relief" Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 35 USF L Rev 727, 747 (2001) (arguing before
Knudson that public policy supported enforcing reimbursement provisions as "equitable relief,"
in part because "[i]f reimbursement-type subrogation provisions are not enforceable ... a plan
fiduciary's only choices will be to either include exclusionary provisions or no subrogation provi-
sions at all (thus driving up the cost of providing the benefits)-in either case, [beneficiaries] are
ultimately harmed by a loss of benefits"). But see Baron, 55 Mercer L Rev at 620-30 (cited in
note 72) (arguing that the insurers receive a windfall through subrogation and that denying
reimbursement will have little or no impact upon insurance rates because subrogated recoveries
presently are not reflected in the setting of rates). The "wait and see" approach is unlikely given
the high administrative costs of the system relative to the alternative plan of simply raising in-
surance rates. Furthermore, if given the choice between insurance providers using the "wait and
see" approach and those with slightly higher rates, insurance customers (including employers
whose desire to pay lower fees is countervailed by a desire to attract high quality employees who
care about when benefits will be distributed) will likely prefer paying higher rates in exchange
for prompt compensation in the event of injury. The "wait and see" approach, if widely imple-
mented, however, would likely alter the administration of ERISA benefits sufficiently to justify
an argument that subrogation provisions "relate to" ERISA in the relevant sense.
140 See 29 USC § 1001(a). The relatively consistent enforcement of contractual obligations
from state to state should also soothe concerns that allowing fiduciaries to bring the state actions
will subvert uniformity. But see Baron, 55 Mercer L Rev at 626 (cited in note 72) ("Given the
intrusive and unfair nature of subrogation in the area of personal injury claims, not surprisingly
at least one state supreme court has declared statutory provisions permitting such subrogation to
be unconstitutional.").
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